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The Practice of Extradition from Antiquity to 
Modern France and the United States: 
a Brief History 
by Christopher L. Blakesley· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article will focus on the history of extradition law as it has influenced 
contemporary law in the United States and France. The purpose of the article 
is to provide insight into the development of the "modern" extradition. The 
author has concluded that the phenomenon of extradition has existed from an-
tiquity. Indeed, although the process has not always been executed by use of a 
treaty agreement, treaty authorized extraditions have existed since antiquity. 
Moreover, a treaty authorized extradition for common crimes, as opposed to 
political offenses, was utilized in the earliest known diplomatic document of 
any kind. This article will discuss evidence, that Grotius andJean Bodin were 
incorrect regarding the rationale for their belief that extradition existed in an-
tiquity, although they were right in contending that extradition existed.' 
In order to understand the extradition phenomenon one must view it from 
the perspective of each of the relevant parties. Obviously, this requires an 
• B.A., U. of Utah; M.A., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts; J.D., U. of Utah; 
LL.M., Columbia; J .S.D. candidate, Columbia. Associate Professor, Louisiana State University 
Law Center. Formerly Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept. of State. 
1. Some of the material considered in this introduction, is also included in a portion of the 
author's article, Blakesley, Extradition Between France and the United States: an Exercise in Comparative 
and International Law, 13 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 653, 655-62 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 
Blakesley J. The material in the Vanderbilt article serves to introduce a technical discussion of the 
modern extradition process and considers only the "modern" development of extradition. This 
article uses the material, along with additional historical information and analysis, in order to 
present the historical development of extradition as a diplomatic/legal phenomenon. Although 
some of the "modern history" of extradition is repeated, it serves a different purpose. Here it 
establishes the proposition that extradition (even by treaty) has existed continuously from antiq-
uity. The purpose of this article is to accept the proposition of Grotius and Bodin that extradition 
has existed since antiquity, while rejecting their rationale for so concluding, and in addition, to 
reject the Pufendorf school's criticism of the hypothesis of Grotius and Bodin. Thus, any retread 
ground serves the independent purpose of presenting extradition as an historical phenomenon. 
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understanding of the historical, anthropological and cultural background to 
the concept of extradition. 
Marjorie Whiteman has defined extradition as: 
the process by which persons charged with or convicted of crime 
against the law of a State and found in a foreign State are returned 
by the latter to the former for trial or punishment. It applies to 
those who are merely charged with an offense but have not been 
brought to trial; to those who have been tried and convicted and 
have subsequently escaped from custody; and to those who have 
been convicted in absentia. It does not apply to persons merely 
suspected of having committed an offense but against whom no 
charge has been laid or to a person whose presence is desired as a 
witness or for obtaining or enforcing a civil judgment. 2 
In 1878, Fernand de Cardaillac defined extradition as "the right for a State 
on the territory of which an accused or convicted person has taken refuge, to 
deliver him up to another State which has requisitioned his return and is com-
petent to judge and punish him. "3 More recently, a French commentator has 
defined it as: • 'The procedure by which a sovereign state, the requested state, 
accepts to deliver an individual who is found on this latter's territory to 
another state, the requesting state, to permit the latter to judge the subject or, 
if he has already been convicted, to have it execute its sentence. ,,~ 
The term "extradition" was imported to the United States from France, 
where the decret-Loi of February 19, 1791, appears to be the first official docu-
ment to have used the term. The term is not found in treaties or conventions 
until 1828.5 The French Treaties with Wurtemberg of March 26, 1759, and of 
December 3, 1765; with Spain of September 29, 1765; and with Spain and 
Portugal in 1778 (ratified July 5, 1783) incorporated the equivalent terms 
restituter (to restore or hand-over) or remettre (to send back, restore or hand-
over).6 The Latin equivalent to extradition, trad.ere, is not found in early Latin 
works, but the comparable term remittere, to remit, is often employed. 7 Thus, 
although the actual term "extradition" was not used essentially until the late 
2. M. WHITEMAN, 6 DIGEST OF INT'L LAW 727 (1968) [hereinafter cited as WHITEMANj. See also 
Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902). 
3. FERNAND DE CARDAILLAC, DE L' EXTRADITION 3-4 (1878) [hereinafter cited as FERNAND DE 
CARDAILLACj Author's translation. 
4. R. MERLE & A. VITU, TRAITE DE DROIT CRIMINEL: PROBLEMES GENERAUX DE LA SCIENCE 
CRIMINELLE 320 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as MERLE & VlTUj. Author's translation. 
5. A. BILLOT, TRAITE DE L'EXTRADITION 34 (1874) [hereinafter cited as BILLOTj. 
6. [d. See, I.g., Convention on Extradition, Dec. 3, 1765, France-Wurtemberg, 43 Parry's 
T.S. 243 (the earlier convention of Mar. 26, 1759 expired and was superseded by this Conven-
tion, see id. at 245); Convention on Extradition, Sep. 29, 1765, France-Spain, 43 Parry's T.S. 
211. 
7. BILLOT, supra note 5, at 34. 
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eighteenth century, the notion was extant, and equivalent or similar terms 
were not uncommon. 8 
The author will first discuss the perception of extradition in antiquity. Then 
extradition in the Middle Ages and in the modern era will be discussed in 
turn. Finally, the author will analyze the issue of whether extradition is proper 
in the absence of a treaty obligation. This analysis will focus on France and the 
United States, two countries which are important in the development of ex-
tradition law and which have taken opposite positions on this issue. The 
author concludes that the practice of extradition under changing legal 
philosophies has established the modern law of extradition. 
II. PERCEPTIONS OF EXTRADITION IN ANTIQUITY 
In order to understand the perceptions of extradition's function and pur-
pose in modern France and the United States, it is important to consider the 
evolution of thought regarding extradition. The French spent a significant 
amount of doctrinal effort considering the question of extradition in antiquity 
and the Middle Ages. 
Extradition, or at least rendition of fugitives from one people or nation to 
another, was not unknown in antiquity. Ancient civilizations appear to have 
developed it and practiced it. 9 In fact, the earliest known diplomatic document 
8. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 6 and 7, supra. Article 20 of the Treaty of Amiens states 
that the contracting parties" are to be obligated to deliver to justice the persons accused ... " 
(i.e., the author's translation of: "siront tenu de livrer en justice les personnes accusies . ... "). E. 
DESCAMP& L. RENAULT,I RECUEILINT'LDESTRAITEsDUXIXe SIECLE33, 42 (1801-1825),42 
DALWZ REPERTOIRE DE LEGISLATION. DOCTRINE ETJURISPRUDENCE495, 579-80 (1861), Treaty 
of Peace Between France, Great Britain, Spain and the Batavian Republic, Mar. 27, 1802, 56 
Parry's T.S. 289, art. 20 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Amiens]. 
9. Langdon & Gardiner, The Treaty of Alliance Between Hattusili King of the Hittites and the Pharaoh 
Ramesses II of Egypt, 6 J. OF EGYPTIAN ARCHAEOLOGY 179 (1920) [hereinafter cited as Langdon & 
Gardiner); W. Mettgenberg, Vor mehr als 3000jahren, 23 ZVOLKR 23 (1939), cited in I. SHEARER, 
EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SHEARER). See C. BASSIOUNI. 
EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as BASSIOUNI); Kutner, 
World Habeas Corpus and International Extradition, 41 U. DET. L. J. 25 (1964); A. NUSSBAUM. A 
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 9,37, 111,208,253,260 (1947) [hereinafter cited as 
NUSSBAUM). 
There are many other excellent works concerned either in whole or in part with criminal law or 
what may be called "international" (or inter-peoples) "law" in antiquity, which contain worth-
while information on the ancient practice of extradition or rendition. These include: E. EGGER. 
ETUDES HISTORIQUES SUR LES TRAITI~S PUBLICS ANCIENS (1866); A. Du Boys, HISTORIE DU 
DROIT CRIMINEL DES PEUPLES ANCIENS (1845); M. FAUSTIN HELIE, TRAITE DE L'INSTRUCTION 
CRIMINELLE Liv. II, ch. V (on extradition) (5th ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as FAUSTIN HELIE, 
TRAITE); J. FOELlX, DROIT INT'L (4th ed. 1866) [hereinafter cited as FOELlX); F. SAINT-AUBIN. 
L'EXTRADITION ET LE DROIT EXTRADITIONNEL (1913) [hereinafter cited as SAINT-AuBIN]; P. 
BERNARD, TRAITE THEoRIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE L'ExTRADmON (2 vols_ 1890) [hereinafter cited 
as BERNARD]; Faustin Helie, Du Droit Pinal dlJns ses Rapports avec Ie Droit des Gens, 17 REVUE DE 
LEGISLATION ET DE JURISPRUDENCE 220 (1843) [hereinafter cited as Faustin Helie, Du Droit 
Pinal]; Billot, supra note 5; M. VILLEFORT, DES TRAITEs D'EXTRADITION DE LA FRANCE AVEC LES 
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of any type contains a section providing for the reciprocal rendition of 
fugitives. This was the Treaty of Peace between Ramses II, Pharaoh of Egypt, 
and the Hittite King Hattusili III, which was signed after the latter's abortive 
attempt to invade and conquer Egypt. 10 This document, written in 
Hieroglyphics, was carved onto the Temple of Ammon at Karnak and is also 
preserved on clay tablets in Akkodrain in the Hittite archives of Boghazkoi. 11 
This document is characteristic of most early examples of extradition or rendi-
tion agreements in that extradition was only part of, and incidental to, a larger 
document designed for a larger purpose. This was also true for the first ex-
tradition documents of the modem era. 12 
Many authorities in France and the United States have written that prior to 
the nineteenth century extradition in the modem sense of that term did not ex-
ist.13 These authorities contend that rendition of fugitives occurred on a 
haphazard basis and that these renditions were totally political occurrences In 
which the political enemies of the various sovereigns, rather than common 
criminals, were the o~jects; coercion, not the binding force of a legal agree-
ment or of some abstract international right or duty, was the true motivator of 
compliance with such requests. a The United States Supreme Court expressed 
the common American view in 1886: 
It is only in modem times that the nations of the earth have im-
posed upon themselves the obligation of delivering up these 
fugitives from justice to the States where their crimes were com-
mitted, for trial and punishment. This has been done generally by 
treaties made by one independent government with another. Prior 
PAYS ETRANGERS (1851) [hereinafter cited as VILLEFORT); V. KIRCHNER. RECUEIL DES TRAITES 
D'ExTRADITION (1883); FERNAND DE CARDIALLAC, supra note 3; P. FIORE. TRAin: DE DROIT 
PENAL INTERNATIONAL ET DE L"EXTRADITION (2d ed. 1880); M. Aupecle, l'Extradition etla Loi de 
10 Mars 1927 (Paris, 1927) (unpublished thesis in Columbia University School of Law Library) 
[hereinafter cited as Aupecle); J. MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDI· 
TION (1891) [hereinafter cited as MOORE); L. KOZIEBRODZKI. LE DROIT D'AsILE (1962); C. 
MONTESQUlEU.3 DEL'ESPRIT DES LOIs. Liv. 25, ch. 3 (,'Des Temples;" this chapter discusses the 
right of assylum in ancient times) (1748); Ginzberg, Asylum in Rabbinical Literature, 2 THEJEWISH 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA 257 (1901). 
10. The Treaty of Alliance Between Hattusili, King of the Hittites, and the Pharoah Ramses 
II of Egypt, is II, 12, 13, 14, Langdon and Gardiner, supra note 9, at 192-94. See SHEARER. supra 
note 9, at 5; BASSIOUNI. supra note 9, at I. 
11. BASSIOUNI. supra note 9, at 3-4. 
12. E.g., Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation (The Jay Treaty), Nov. 19, 1794 
(entered into force Oct. 28, 1795), United States-Great Britain, art. 27,8 Stat. 116, T.S. 105, 
collected in I. BEVANS. 12 TREATIES AND OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA [BEVANS) 13, W. MALLOY. 1 TREATIES. CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS. PRO-
TOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER POWERS 
[MALLOY) 590 (1910) [hereinafter cited as the Jay Treaty); Treaty of Amiens, supra note 8, art. 
20. 
13. Se, text accompanying note 20 irifra. 
14. E.g., L. OPPENHEIM, I INT'LLAW696, 704 (8th ed. 1958); C. DE VISSCHER. THEORY AND 
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to these treaties, and apart from them, it may be stated as the 
general result of the writers upon international law , that there was 
no well-defined obligation on one country to deliver up such 
fugitives to another, and though such delivery was often made, it 
was upon the principle of comity, and within the discretion of the 
government whose action was invoked; and it has never been 
recognized as among those obligations of one government towards 
another which rest upon established principles of international 
law. ls 
43 
A debate over whether or not extradition existed in antiquity raged in 
French academic circles near the end of the nineteenth century. One side, 
represented most notably by Professor Billot, the Ridacteur for the Ministire des 
Affaires Etrangires at the time, opposed the view that extradition had existed 
since antiquity. 16 Professor Billot maintained that the examples, claimed to be 
"extradition" by Hugo Grotius and Jean Bodin in the seventeenth century 
and later cited by Faustin HeIiel7 and Paul Bernardl8 to support their argu-
ment that extradition did occur in antiquity, were not really analogous to the 
contempory phenomenon of extradition. 19 A clear statement of this "non-
believer" position was made by Professor Villefort in his treatise on extradi-
tion: 
The authors who have written on the subject, and particularly the 
publicists of the seventeenth century, have pushed the origin of ex-
tradition back to antiquity. But, in truth, the examples they cite 
can not be analogized to our present extraditions. They were not 
matters of malefactors requisitioned by the nation of which they 
had found refuge. All these examples refer to ... violations of the 
Law of Nations, like aggression, violations of territory, pillaging of 
temples, committed by inhabitants of the 'country' to which the 
outraged nation comes to demand satisfaction for the offense 
through the rendition of the culpable. If there were a refusal (by 
the requested 'state'), war would result. These events appear to 
belong to an entirely different order of idea, and one discerns this 
by the attempt to explain the rarity of extradition cases in antiquity 
by claiming that the infrequency was the effect of the law of asylum 
REAl.ITY IN PUBl.IC INT'L LAW 243-44 (P. Corbett trans. 1957); Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 9. 
15. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407,411 (1886). Set Holmes v.Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 
Pet.) 540 (1840). 
16. BILLOT. supra note 5, at 35. 
17. FAUSTIN HELIE. fRAITE. supra note 9; Faustin Heme, Du Droit Pinal, supra note 9. 
18. BERNARD. supra note 9, vol. 2 at 22-65. 
19. BILLOT, supra note 5, at 35-40. Among the other scholars in the Billot camp were: M. 
Villefort, Fernand de Cardaillac, and P. Fiore, whose works on the subject are cited in note 9 
supra. 
BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. IV, No.1 
and other considerations which really can only have had secondary 
influence. The true general cause is that a principle similar to 
modern extradition cannot exist amidst the state of hostile isolation 
in which the peoples of that epoch lived. In order for extradition to 
enter into international usage, it requires no less than the moral 
solidarity which ties the diverse modern nations. During the entire 
Middle Ages, and even after several centuries which followed, one 
can say that extradition only had an accidental existence; it is only 
barely by the end of the eighteenth century that this right appears 
to have been admitted universally by virtue of the principle of 
reciprocity. 20 
Both sides of the debate believed that if extradition in the "contemporary" 
sense of that term occurred, it had to have occurred by authority of' 'natural 
right and justice." That is, they all believed that rendition of fugitives was not 
extradition, unless it was motivated by the participants' belief that they were 
obligated by "natural right and justice" or the moral solidarity of the" com-
munity of nations" to do so. Indeed, Grotius presented his examples of "ex-
tradition" as proof that all nations had a "natural right and duty" either to 
extradite or to prosecute malefactors. 21 Grotius' ancient examples were at-
tacked as not meeting the requisites of his own definition. They were seen as 
rare or accidental happenings accomplished solely by force or coercion. 
Therefore, argued the Billot school, if no rendition occurred in antiquity by 
authority of' 'natural right," or rights based on the solidarity of nations, and 
the corresponding obligation to have reciprocal rendition of fugitives between 
nations, there was no extradition. 
Even if it were true, as the Billot school asserts, that few extraditions oc-
curred in antiquity which were perceived as having a basis in some abstract, 
reciprocal, international right and corellative obligation, the same proposition 
is also true today.22 Neither French nor United States law perceives a duty to 
20. VILLEFORT, supra note 9, at 5. Author's translation. M. Villefort labors under the percep-
tion \hat the" modern" world has a "community of nations." But see generally, e.g., Boyle, The Ir-
relevance of Int 'I Law: The Schism Between Int'l Law and Int'l Politics, lOCAL. W. INT'L L. J. 193 
(1980). 
21. E.g., H. GROTIUS, II DEJURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 526-29 (F. Kelsey trans. 1925). 
It is true that many of the examples proposed by the seventeenth century writers to indicate that 
extradition was practiced in antiquity, were presented primarily to prove that there was a natural 
duty to extradite or prosecute all criminals. /d. 
22. The notion of an abstract, natural right of extradition based on international solidarity has 
not been recognized in United States case law, at least since 1840. Extradition from the United 
States has traditionally been allowed only on the basis of a treaty obligation. See, e.g., Holmes v. 
Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886); Valen-
tine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5 (1936). See also the discussion of the duty to extradite based on a 
treaty obligation, notes 57-93 and accompanying text, infra. 
Despite the requirement of a treaty obligation to extradite, the United States Government will 
accept extradition of a fugitive from a country with which the United States has no treaty. During 
a two-year period in the Legal Adviser's office in the U.S. Department of State, the author 
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extradite, apart from that imposed by a treaty or other agreement to extradite. 
Thus the Billot school due to its own perception of the nature of international 
law took Grotius to task over the wrong issue, as it certainly does not follow 
that a lack of participant belief in a natural obligation to extradite establishes 
the non-existence of extradition. 
Extradition in antiquity did not represent any constant practice or develop 
into any science of extradition. This reservation :-vas accepted by the major 
nineteenth century proponents of the Grotius view that extradition existed in 
antiquity.23 It is also true that there was usually quite a close affinity between 
ancient extradition and the laws of war. Moreover, corruption, violence and 
menace were often the "tools for execution" utilized to obtain the rendition of 
fugitives. 24 This is not difficult to understand, given the ongoing relations 
among the peoples of antiquity which was similar to that of the Middle Ages. 
The territorial and national ruler during these epochs considered it a duty of 
his honor to protect fugitives entering his territory. This duty to protect 
fugitives became linked to the very prepollence and integrity of the ruler. Any 
act or demand emanating from a foreign power to obtain jurisdiction over any 
person within another power's territory represented at least a potential treat to 
the sovereignty of the requested ruler. 25 This approach is not totally consistent 
with the modem notion of extradition which has legality as its essence. 
However, it does not follow from this that there was no extradition in antiqui-
ty. Authority for and relationships according rendition of fugitives were 
authorized and "legalized" by treaties. 26 
Ancient history does provide examples of individuals being delivered up 
between peoples not only for political offenses or acts of aggression against the 
"sovereign," but also for murder, rape, theft, robbery, abduction and other 
serious, non-political offenses. 27 Indeed, many ancient and medieval rendi-
tions resemble present day extradition much more than the nineteenth century 
"nonbelievers" would admit. 
observed several ofthese extraditions. For a discussion of this topic and an analysis of the current 
law of extradition in general and between France and the United States see Blakesley, supra note 
1. 
23. See BERNARD, supra note 9; at 22-65. See also FAUSTIN HELIE, TRAITE, supra note 9; Faustin 
Helie, Du Droit Pinal, supra note 9. 
24. FERNAND DE CARDAILLAC. supra note 3, at 5. 
25. See, e.g., SAINT.AUBIN. supra note 9, at 1 (chapter entitled Origine de I 'Extradition). In-
terestingly, this reaction of sovereign jealousy is not too different from today's sovereign reaction 
to problems in extradition cases. Many of the formal requirements, such as the necessity of using 
the diplomatic channel, stem, at least partially, from jealousy of encroaching sovereignty. The 
sensitivity over problems arising in connection with extradition cases also derives from this 
phenomenon. 
26. E.g., Langdon & Gardiner, supra note 9. (Treaty of Alliance Between Hattusili III and 
Ramses II). 
27. O'Higgins, The History of Extradition in British Practice, 13 INDIAN Y. B. OF INT'L AFF. 78, 
108 (1964); 6 BRIT. DIG. OF INT'L L. 445 (1965). See SHEARER, supra note 9, at 5. 
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One of the problems scholars have had in interpreting ancient rendition of 
fugitives is the fact that for a long period of time in human history there were 
no "states." Acts, such as theft, murder or rape, considered common crimes 
today, were su~ject to "private justice" or individual reprisal rather than the 
modern reaction of a sovereign or state. 28 
Patriarchal families, tribes, and clans were in control of their own destiny 
and their own justice. The paterfamilias represented the "sovereignty" of the 
family, clan, or tribe. Moreover, in ancient social cells, such as the family, 
clan, or tribe, expulsion was the ultimate penalty for internal crime. For ex-
ample, endangering the tribal food supply usually incurred the sanction of 
banishment. Thus, if the ultimate sanction was banishment, the authority of 
the social cell certainly would not seek the return of individuals who had com-
mitted offenses within the cell. Even in the very early social cells certain ac-
tivities were considered "criminal," as they threatened the society as a whole. 
When a serious offense occurred, for example, in addition to banishment, it 
was necessary that the cell purge itself from the" curse of the gods or the threat 
of the unknown.' '29 
The paterfamilias or tribal chieftain, in keeping with whatever procedure was 
required by its law and custom, would determine what activities were to be 
deemed punishable. Different conduct was considered dangerous, therefore 
punishable, by different groups at different times. When murder, theft, or 
assault, which were relatively rare although not unheard of in the kinship 
group, occurred as a result of external intervention into the social cell, retalia-
tion, vengeance, or an attempt to acquire the return of the perpetrators often 
resulted, so that the "purging" of the crime could take place. When this con-
duct occurred internally, the result was usually banishment or a phenomenon 
called the composition. The latter was similar to what modern states reserve for 
tort claims. The injured individual was compensated by the perpetrator or his 
family for the damage done.'o Composition was not entirely tort-like, however, 
as the social cell often felt obliged to purge itself of the threat of metaphysical 
dangers resulting from the occurrence of the wrongful act. 31 
Thus, offenses committed by individuals belonging to the tribe or social cell 
were met with sanctions determined by the paterfamilias or a designated group 
28. See Tappa, Pre-Classical Pmow/IY, in C.O.W. MUELLER. ESSAYS IN CRIMINAL SCIENCE 33 
(1961). 
29. E.g., R. Fairbanks, A Discussion of the Nation State Status of American Indian Tribes: A 
Case Study of the Cheyenne Nation 31 (1976) (unpublished LL. M. thesis in Columbia Universi-
ty School of Law Library) [hereinafter cited as Fairbanks thesis). Intra-tribal murder, for exam-
ple, in Native American society "required the keeper of the arrows to cleanse the tribe of the 
spectre of death." !d. See M. FUSTEL DE COULANGES, LA CITI~ ANTIQUE, Liv. III, Ch. XIII 
(1864) [hereinafter cited as FUSTEL DE COULANGESJ. 
30. See H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 358 (5th ed. 1878) [hereinafter cited as MAINE). 
31. See Fairbanks thesis, supra note 29; K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: 
CONFUCT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941); FUSTEL DE COULANGES, supra 
note 29. 
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under his direction. Ifbanishment were the sanction, "escape" from the sanc-
tion by flight, obviously, presented no problem; no tribe would seek the 
fugitive's return to banish him. If the" fugitive" were needed for the tribal ex-
piation, his rendition would be sought. 
The sanction for another tribe's refusal to return such a fugitive was often 
war or an attack to punish the entire refusing tribe, thus, purging the taint 
through punishment by proxy. Notwithstanding the "private justice" caveat, 
attempts to obtain rendition of fugitives were sometimes not too dissimilar 
from modern extradition. 
Indeed in ancient Israel it was considered necessary to have a murderer ex-
piate his sin and purge society of its blemish through spilling the criminal's 
blood. 32 Asylum was possible for those who committed sin or crime involun-
tarily, but not for the intentional wrongdoer. 33 Thus, the intentional 
wrongdoer's extradition was sought. Similarly, the Code of Manu provided that 
there was to be no possibility of happiness for the criminal or society without 
puniShment. Rest and happiness for the sinner and society must be obtained 
through a soul-purging punishment of the wrong-doer. 3• Extradition, there-
therefore, had to be sought. 
This practice continued as society expanded beyond the family, clan, or 
tribe and individuals or cliques acquired authority, more or less enforceable, 
over several smaller social cells. As the concept of group identity and solidarity 
broadened, acts previously considered to be external and requiring group 
vengeance became internal and required application of the internal "criminal 
justice system." Attempts to obtain rendition of fugitive violators of the law 
became more and more common. 35 
Thus, although there was no constant practice or development of a science 
of extradition in antiquity, many ancient societies sought the return of com-
mon criminals. These renditions had some characteristics similar to those of 
modern extradition. Often the request was made "officially" through the 
respective "sovereigns." Rendition was sought for "common" and political 
type crimes. 
32. Su, t.g., 1 Kings 2:28-34. 
33. Cj Joshua 20: 9 (cities of asylum to which one who kills might flee); I Kings 1 :50-53 (taking 
asylum at the altar). 
34. Code of Manu, Bk. VII, 18,23-24, Bk. VIII, 17. On the Hindu Code, or Laws of Manu (or 
Menu), stt generally, t.g., MAINE. supra note 30, at 16-17; S. SINHA. ASYLUM AND INT'L LAW 6 
(1971) [hereinafter cited as SINHA). 
35. The following incidents in history range from something very similar to today's extradi-
tion to what the Billot school would denominate "non-analogous" occurrences. Some of the ex-
amples have aspects of both "modern extradition" and "non-analogous" occurrences. The 
Lacedaemonians made war on the Messenians when the latter refused to deliver up the 
perpetrators of rape and violation of young Lacedaemonian girls sent to religious ceremonies. 
Strabo, ch. VIII, cited in BERNARD, supra note 9, at 26. The Lacedaemonians made war on the 
Messenians another time because the latter did not deliver up the assassin of a Lacedaemonian. 
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III. EXTRADITION FROM THE MIDDLE AGES TO THE 
EARLY MODERN ERA 
[Vol. IV, No.1 
An examination of fugitive rendition during the Middle Ages indicates that 
a rather large number of renditions were accomplished by way of formal con-
vention. Many early conventions, including the Treaty of 1174, between 
Henry II and Guillaume of Scotland, and the 1303 Treaty of Paris, between 
Edward II of England and Phillippe Ie Bel of France, were basically political in 
nature. 36 Their basic purpose was to provide for the return of political enemies 
of the respective sovereigns. Even so, they constituted reciprocal sovereign 
agreements to deliver up felons who had taken refuge in the requested 
sovereign's territoryY 
The Convention of March 4, 1376, between Charles V ("the Wise"), King 
of France, and the Count of Savoy, was most similar to the modern concep-
tualization of extradition. 38 It was the most non-political convention of the 
time period. The Convention called for the reciprocal rendition of "malefac-
tors promptly upon the first request" specifying that the perpetrators of com-
mon crimes would be delivered up. The purpose of the Convention was to 
combat crimes and common criminals in general more than to punish or 
persecute political enemies. 
Pausanias, Bk. IV, cited in BERNARD, supra note 9, at 26. Several ofthe Tribes ofIsraei addressed a 
request to the Tribe of Benjamin for the delivery of certain citizens of Gibeah who were the 
authors of the rape and murder of the concubine belonging to the Levite sojourning on Mount 
Ephraim. Judges, 19, 20. The Levite, who, being the "victim," had the responsibility and the 
right to take vengeance for the crime, sent a portion of his concubine's cadaver to each Tribe of 
Israel to symbolize their unity and solidarity in vengeance for the crime. Refusal to deliver up the 
fugitives brought the Tribe of Benjamin devastation by war. The grisly nature of the evidence 
and the reprisal for refusal, epitomized some of the basic differences between some ancient "ex-
traditions" and the modern phenomenon. The Philistines sought delivery from the Hebrews of 
Samson, who was charged with having ravaged the former's harvests and with having massacred 
some Philistine compatriots. Judges, 15. Simon, brother ofJohathan, received, in exchange for a 
gold shield, an agreement for the extradition of Israelite criminals wherever found in the entire 
Roman Empire. Mace, Bk. LXV, cited in BERNARD, supra note 9, at 26. 
36. See H. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, TRAITE DE DROIT CRIMINEL ET DE LEGISLATION PENALE 
COMPAREE 975 (3d ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as DONNEDIEU DE VABRES); C. CALVO, DROIT 
INT'L Liv. IX (1896) [hereinafter cited as CALVO); BERNARD, supra note 9, at 135; MERLE & 
VITU, supra note 4, at 321; P. BOUZAT & J. PINATEL, TRAITE DE DROIT PENAL ET DE 
CRIMINOLOGIE, 1657-58 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as BOUZAT & PINATELj; FERNAND DE 
CARDAILLAC, supra note 3, at 9; FOELIX, supra note 9, at vol. II, 331. 
37. See BERNARD, supra note 9, at 152-53. See also CHRISTINE DE PISAN, LE LIVRE DES FAITS ET 
BONNES MOEURS DU SAGE ROY CHARLES V, Part II, ch. X (c. 1411) (Paris, 1936-40 S. Solente 
ed.) [hereinafter cited as C. DEPISAN); CALvO,supra note 36, at Bk. IX; BERNARD, supra note 9, at 
135. 
38. SeeC. DEPISAN,supra note 37, at Part II, ch. X; ST. AUBIN,supra note 9, at 14. See also DON· 
NEDIEU DE V ABRES, supra note 36; CALVO, supra note 36; MERLE & VITU, supra note 4; BOUZAT & 
PINATEL, supra note 36; FERNAND DE CARDAILLAC, supra note 3; FOELIX, supra note 9. The Con-
vention between Charles the Wise and the Count of Savoy made no distinction between crimes 
and de1its, which was a purposeful attempt to avoid confusion or difficulty in interpretation. The 
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Nevertheless, as late as the 1660's, the purpose of most major rendition 
agreements remained essentially political. For example, when Denmark and 
Holland delivered to England those persons implicated in the murder ot 
Charles I, the renditions were accomplished pursuant to a Convention con-
cluded on February 23, 1661, between Charles II and the Government of 
Denmark,39 and a Convention concluded on September 14, 1662, between 
England and Holland.·o There was a hint of non-political extradition in the 
latter Convention. Although Holland undertook to deliver to England certain 
individuals who had been excepted from the Bill of Amnesty, "all other per-
sons that would be reclaimed by England" were also included. H 
Louis XIV provides a striking example of Seventeenth Century politically 
oriented "rendition" in conjunction with his revocation of the Edict of 
Nantes. When he prohibited emigration from his realm, a large number ofthe 
inhabitants of the City of Gex, nevertheless, expatriated themselves. In 1679, 
Ie Grand Louis "requested" (rather demanded) the magistrates of Geneva to 
order the return, en masse, of the expatriates. The magistrates of Geneva issued 
a decree ordering the Gexois to return to their homeland. Most did not return, 
however, and Louis, displeased by the magistrates' effort, issued another "re-
quest." This time he threatened Geneva with a reaction that would make 
them "repent of having displeased him. ".2 Thus, the magistrates ordered 
their own citizens to deliver up the expatriates under the threat of corporal 
punishment.·3 
To discuss the early development of extradition without mentioning the 
great criminalist Beccaria, would not be proper. Although Beccaria's interests 
certainly transcended this narrow issue, he had clearly defined views on ex-
tradition in keeping with his general philosophy of criminal justice. Extradi-
tion, after all, was a part of the overall fabric of criminal justice. Beccaria 
believed that extradition could playa role in diminishing crime. He stated 
that, "the conviction of finding nowhere a span of earth where real crimes 
were pardoned might be the most efficacious way of preventing their occur-
rence."H This comment reflects his distaste for the almost religious sanctity 
procedure for extradition under this Treaty was very simple. Once the fact of an accused person's 
status as a fugitive had been established by a summary examination, the fugitive was to be remit-
ted promptly upon the first request. See SAINT.AuBIN, supra note 9, at 14-15. 
39. See FERNAND DE CARDAILLAC, supra note 3, at 9. 
40. /d.; E. CLARKE, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF EXTRADITION 20 (4th ed. 1903). 
41. FERNANDDECARDAILLAC, supra note 3, at 9. 
42. This "request" represents the best example of what the Billot camp of "non-believers" 
refer to as events that are "non-analogous" to modern extradition events. BERNARD, supra note 9, 
vol. I, at 290-91, citing Depping, Correspondmce A.dministratif, tome IV, and quoting Louis XIV. 
43. Aupecle, supra note 9, at 13. 
44. C. BECCARIA, DEI DELITTI E DELLE PENE (1764), translated in J. FARRER, CRIMES AND 
PUNISHMENTS 193-94 (1880) [hereinafter cited as BECCARIA). See generally M. MAESTRO, CESARE 
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possessed by the notion of asylum during the period. Beccaria qualified his 
stand, however, by stating that he would not decide an extradition's ultimate 
usefulness" until laws more in conformity with the needs of humanity, until 
milder penalties, and until the emancipation of law from the caprice of mere 
opmlOn, shall have given security to oppressed innocence and hated 
virtue .... "45 These ideas found their way into extradition and influenced, 
among other ideas, the rule of speciality and that of dual criminality. 
IV. EXTRADITION IN THE MODERN ERA 
A 1376 Treaty between France and Savoy,46 was an incipient modern ex-
tradition treaty. In spite of this early, propitious beginning to "modernity" in 
extradition, it was not until 1736, that another treaty so modern would appear. 
It was in 1736, that France and Holland established an agreement for the ex-
tradition of individuals charged with having committed common crimesY 
This compact was followed by accords between France and Egypt, 
Switzerland, Sardinia, and several German States. 48 
BECCARIA AND THE ORIGINS OF PENAL REFORM (1973). Beccaria's chef d'oeuvre, DEI DELITTI E 
DELLE PENE, has been one of the most influential works in the field of criminal justice in modern 
western history. Beccaria's theory of criminal justice is based on philosophical utilitarianism. He 
believed that the punishment for crime should follow directly and surely upon its commission and 
that the punishment must fit the offense. His goals were to reduce crime, to induce the modera-
tion of barbaric punishment, to eradicate the inequality of applicatian of criminal law and to 
make the punishment following the commission of a crime by anyone be swift and sure. 
Beccaria was a bit ambivalent regarding extradition; he wanted no sanctuaries, but he wanted 
extradition to be fair and based on law. Voltaire, probably the greatest and most influential 
devotee of Beccaria's philosophy of criminal justice, found himself an example of the reason Bec-
caria was ambivalent about extradition. Frederick the Great had sought Voltaire's extradition 
from the Free City of Frankfurt, because, after a dispute with the Great Frederick, Voltaire had 
quit Potsdam carrying a book of verse in which he portrayed Frederick deriding Louis XV, 
Madame de Pompadour, and the Empress Marie Therese, among others. Pursuant to the Prus-
sian's request, Voltaire was arrested in Frankfort for extradition. Although he was not ex-
tradited, he remained in a Frankfurt prison for several weeks awaiting a decision. See Aupecle, 
supra note 9, at 14. 
Ancient religious society developed a different rationale for the swift and sure punishment 
sought by classical Beccarian penology. Anciently, breach of the law constituted an offense 
against God. Thus, there was no authority to condone or to provide refuge. SINHA, supra note 34, 
at 6. The Code of Manu required punishment for all crime. As the soul never died, it was a 
religious necessity and a prerequisite for happiness in the next life to expiate by punishment for 
the sins of this life. Manu, Lois dt Manous, annotated in French by L. Deslongschamps, Vol. I, Bk. 
VII, 18, 23-24, Bk. VIII, 17 (1830), cittd in SINHA, supra note 34, at 37 n.9. 
45. BECCARIA, supra note 44, at 193-94. 
46. Set note 38 and accompanying text, supra. 
47. SAINT-AuBIN, supra note 9, at 15-16. 
48, Id. G. F. Martens lists ninety-two treaties concerning the return of fugitives concluded 
between 1718 and 1830. G. F. MARTENS, RECUEIL DE TRAITEs, 7 vols. (1791-1826), Sup-
PLEMENTS AU RECUEIL DE PRINCIPAUX TRAITES, 20 vols. (1802-42), cited in SHEARER, supra note 9, 
at 8. 
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France continued to take an uncontested role of leadership in the develop-
ment of extradition law during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the 
middle and later part of the eighteenth century, France concluded bilateral ex-
tradition treaties with all of her neighbors, except Great Britain. 49 The Treaty 
of 1759 between France and W urtemberg was the prototype of the extradition 
treaty of the modern era. 50 Extradition was still possible in these early treaties, 
however, for political offenses and desertion from the armed forces as well as 
for common crimes. 
The rules and procedures established in these conventions endure in the law 
of extradition to this day. The rules required extradition requests to be made 
through the diplomatic channel, or at least through specific frontier 
authorities. Exact reciprocity was demanded. The requesting state was re-
quired to provide an act of accusation or of condemnation with its request. 
The costs were charged to the requesting state. 
France was clearly the catalyst for development of the law of extradition 
from the end of the eighteenth to the end of the nineteenth centuries, and 
probably earlier. Most of the remaining modern, substantive and procedural 
characteristics and principles of extradition, that had not been developed by 
France prior to the end of the eighteenth century, were generated by France 
during this one-hundred year period. The political offense exemption and the 
prescriptive limitation to extradition, for example, were initiated in the 1834 
Treaty between France and BelgiumY The Treaty of 1844, between France 
and Luxembourg, was the first to incorporate the prohibition against pros-
ecuting fugitives returned by way of extradition for any offense except those 
49. A listing of current extradition treaties relating to France appears in R. MERLE& A. VITU, 
TRAITE DE DROIT CRIMINEL: PROBLEMES GENERAUX DE LA SCIENCE CRIMINELLE 389 (3d ed. 
1978). For example France entered into bilateral treaty arrangements with Wurtemburg in 1759, 
Holland in 1765, Spain in 1765, and Portugal in 1783. See BILLOT, supra note 5, at 34. 
50. This treaty is usually cited as the prime example of the nascent modern extradition treaty. 
E.g., SHEARER, supra note 9, at 10, 17, 103; BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 4-5; Aupecle, supra note 9, 
at 14-16. 
The Treaty between France and Wurtemburg, of December 3, 1765, provides for the extradi-
tion of "brigands, malefactors, robbers, incendiaries, murderers, assassins, vagabonds, cavalry, 
infantrymen, dragoons and howards (light cavalry)." Author's translation. G. F. MARTENS, 6 
RECUEIL DE TRAITEs 42 (1800); 43 Parry's T.S. 243. 
51. Convention on the Extradition of Criminals, Nov. 22, 1834, Belgium-France, 84 Parry's 
T.S. 457, 22 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 223, art. 5. Billot insists that France first in-
troduced the political offense exemption in an exchange of notes between France and Switzerland 
on September 30, 1833, just prior to the use of the principle in the Belgian domestic law of ex-
tradition of October 1, 1833. BILLOT, supra note 9, at 12, 109-10,425. See SHEARER, supra note 9, 
at 18 n.l; Deere, Political Offenses in the Law and Practice of Extradition, 27 AM.J. INT'L L. 247, 250-
51 (1933). For a discussion of the political offense exception to extradition, see Blakesley, supra 
note 1, at 697-706. 
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listed in the treaty. 52 This later developed into the rule of speciality, first seen 
in the 1850 Treaty between France and Saxony. 53 
Although French influence was comparatively stronger, United States' 
judicial decisions were important in the early development of modern extradi-
tion law. Sir Edward Clarke betrayed his bias for the Anglo-American system 
of judicially developed law, when he extolled the value of the American in-
fluence: 
In the matter of extradition the American law was, until 1870 bet-
ter than that of any country in the world; and the decisions of the 
American judges are the best existing exposition of the duty of ex-
tradition, in its relations at once to the judicial rights of nations 
and the general interests of the civilization of the world. 54 
The first two general treaties between the United States and Great Britain5> 
and the first between the United States and France56 had significantly adopted 
the law of extradition as developed by the French theoreticians and American 
judges. These treaties set the trend for the development of extradition law in 
the United States. 
52. Convention on Extradition, Sep. 26, 1844, France-Luxembourg, 97 Parry's T.S. 317. See 
BILLOT, supra note 9, at 526; SHEARER, supra note 9, at 18. 
53. Convention on Extradition, Apr. 28, 1850, France-Saxony, 104 Parry's T.S. 69. See 
BILLOT, supra note 9, at 552; SHEARER, supra note 9, at 18. The rule of speciality requires that the 
returned fugitive be tried only for those offenses for which he was extradited. See Blakesley, supra 
note 1, at 706-09. The 1850 Treaty between France and Spain allowed the principle of speciality 
to be waived upon request. Convention on Extradition, Aug. 26, 1850, France-Spain, 104 
Parry's T.S. 293, art. 7. See BILLOT, supra note 9, at 498. 
54. E. CLARKE, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF EXTRADITION 28-29 (2d ed. 1874). 
55. The jay Treaty, supra note 12, art. 27. A general analysis of the Treaty is found in S. 
BEMIS,jAY'S TREATY: A STUDY IN COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY (2d ed. 1962). Article 27 reads: 
It is further agreed that His Majesty and the United States on mutual requisitions, by 
them respectively, or by their respective Ministers or officers authorized to m'ake the 
same, will deliver up to justice all persons who, being charged with murder or forgery, 
committed within the jurisdiction of either, shall seek an asylum within any of the coun-
tries of the other, provided that this shall only be done on such evidence of criminality 
as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be 
found, would justify his apprehension and committment for trial, if the offense had 
there been committed. The expense of such apprehension and delivery shall be borne 
and defrayed by those who make the requisition and receive the fugitive. 
The jay Treaty, supra note 12, art. 27. Convention on Boundaries, the Slave Trade and Extradi-
tion (Webster-Ashburton Treaty), Aug. 9, 1842, United States-Great Britain, 8 Stat. 572, TS 
119,12 BEVANS 82, 1 MALLOY 650, art. 10. This Treaty extended the list of extraditable offenses 
from murder and forgery, as in the jay Treaty, to include arson, piracy, robbery and uttering 
forged papers. /d. 
56. Treaty of Extradition, Nov. 9, 1843, United States-France, 8 Stat. 581, TS 89, 7 BEVANS 
830, 1 MALLOY 526. This was the first United States treaty to include a political offense clause. 
/d. art. v. As evidenced by the 1889 Supplementary Convention to the Webster-Ashburton Trea-
ty, Extradition Convention, jul. 12, 1889, United States-Great Britain, 26 Stat. 1508, TS 139, 
12 BEVANS 211, the political offense clause was soon adopted as standard in United States ex-
tradition treaties. /d., art. ii. 
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V. EXTRADITION WITHOUT TREATY OBLIGATION 
A distinguishing feature of the law relating to extradition in France as op-
posed to that in the United States is the ability of the French Government to 
extradite fugitives without the authority of a treaty. The reason for the distinc-
tion is the American constitutional prescription that the Executive Branch has 
no prerogative to dispose of the liberty of the individual. Unless the Executive 
has been given this authority by treaty after the advice and consent of the 
Senate, there is no executive discretion to surrender a fugitive to a foreign 
stateY France did not develop the same constitutional prohibition. 
De Vattel believed that each state has a duty, imposed by international law , 
to extradite all those who have been accused of committing serious crimes. 58 
Jean Bodin and Hugo Grotius believed that there was a "natural duty" under 
international law, either to extradite or to prosecute fugitives, from one state's 
justice, who are found within another state's borders.59 The views of Bodin, 
Grotius and de Vattel have been followed by a diverse group of scholars. 60 
Pufendorf and others of the "positivist school" have disagreed, however, and 
argue that extradition is only an imperfect obligation requiring a special com-
pact or treaty to secure the full force and effect of international law . 61 
A. Extradition Allowed with No Treaty Obligation - France 
The Continental conceptualization of extradition, exemplified by that of 
France, evolved away from the "natural law" theory of Bodin and Grotius 
that each state has a duty to extradite or to prosecute. Nevertheless, French 
law explicitly allows extradition without any treaty obligation. 
In the late nineteenth century, Professor Billot wrote that it is "an estab-
lished principle that extradition may be authorized in the absence of a 
treaty."62 French judicial decisions recognized this principle as early as 1827: 
57. See, e.g., Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5 (1936). 
58. E. DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS 311-13 (Liv. 2, ch. 6, §P6, 77)(1758)(Carnegielnst. 
1916). 
59. J. BODIN, LES SIX LIVRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE (1576), THE SIX BOOKES OF A COM· 
MONWEALE (Harvard Pol. Classics, K. D. McRae ed. 1962) 100-11; H. GROTIUS, II DEJURE 
BELLI AC PACIS (1646) (F. Kelsey, trans. 1925) 527. Cj., note 29 supra (ancient religious duty to 
punish). 
60. See, e.g., H. WEATON, ELEMENTS OF INT'L LAW 188 (5th ed. C. Phillipson ed. 1916). The 
list of scholars accepting the "natural duty" view of extradition includes: Heineccius, Burlama-
qui, Rutherford, Schmelzing and Kent. /d. See SHEARER, supra note 9, at 24; BASSIOUNI, supra 
note 9, at 7. 
61. E.g., S. PUFENDORF, THE ELEMENTS OF UNIVERSALJURISPRUDENCE, Bk. VII, c. 3, H 23, 
24 (1672, W. Oldfather trans. 1931). See WHEATON, supra note 60, at 188. Among other early 
adherents of the "positivist" view are: Voet, Martens, Kluber, Leyser, Luit, Saalfeld, Schmaltz, 
Mittermaier and Heffter. SHEARER, supra note 9, at 24; BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 7. The United 
States Supreme Court has followed the tenets of the "positivist school." See, e.g., Valentine v. 
United States, 299 U.S. 5 (1936). 
62. BILLOT, supra note 5, at 259 (emphasis supplied). See H. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, LES PRIN· 
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rTlhe right to deliver up a foreigner, accused of a crime or a 
misdemeanor in his country of origin, to the tribunals of that coun-
try, does not take its point of origin in treaties concluded with 
foreign Powers; but in the rights which the King derives from his 
birth and by virtue of which he maintains relations of comity with 
neighboring States. 63 
In 1872, the French Minister of Justice provided explicit recognition of the 
authority to extradite in the absence of any treaty when he issued a circulaire to 
the effect that extradition might be granted in the absence of a treaty on the 
basis of reciprocity. This circulaire stipulates that the rules applicable to such an 
undertaking are those of international law. 64 Although authority exists in 
France for allowing extradition in the absence of a treaty, the extradition trea-
ty has been the most constant source of developing extradition law. 
The French source of authority to extradite in the absence of a treaty is no 
longer the King's birthright, but the Extradition Law of 1927.65 Article Iof 
the Extradition Law, however, recognizes the premier position of the extradi-
tion treaty: "In the absence of a treaty, the conditions, the procedures and the 
effects of extradition are determined by the dispositions of the present law.' '66 
The French Extradition Law of 1927,67 therefore, expressly applies only in 
CIPESMoDERNESDEDROITPENALINT"L249 (1928); MERLE& VITU,supra Hote 4, at 322; BOUZAT 
& PINATEL, supra note 36, at 1658-59. Today, in the absence of a treaty, the source of authority 
for extradition is the Extradition Law of Mar. 10, 1927, "Loi Relative a I'extradition des etrangers" 
[1927) DALLOZ PERIOD/QUE IV 265; [1927) SIREY RECUEIL GENERAL 910; CODE DE PROCEDURE 
PENALE363 (laws cited following art. 696) (Petits Codes Dalloz, 21st ed., 1979-1980) [hereinafter 
cited as Law of Mar. 10, 1927). 
63. judgment of jun. 30, 1827, Cour de Cassation, 52 BULL. DE CASSATION (CRIMINEL) 
541(1827). See BILLOT, supra note 5, at 259; SHEARER, supra note 9, at 30-31 n.6. 
64. Circulaire du Garde des Sceaux, jul. 30, 1872, § 8, reprinted in BILWT, supra note 5, at 422-23. 
See SHEARER, supra note 9, at 25. 
65. Law of Mar. 10, 1927, supra note 62. See Donnedieu de Vabres, De l'Extradition, 20 
BULLETIN DE LA SOCIETE D'ETUDE LEGISLATIVE 330 (1924); Donnedieu de Vabres, La Loi du 10 
mars 1927, sur I 'Extradition des Etrangers, [1927) SEMAINEjURIDIQUE593; Donnedieu de Vabres, La 
Nouvelle Loi Relative it I' Extradition des Etrangers, 2 ETUDE CRIMINOLOGIQUES 21 (1927); Donnedieu 
de Vabres, Le Regime Nouveau de ('Extradition d'apres La Loi du 10 mars 1927, 22 REVUE CRITIQUE DE 
DROIT INT'L PRIVE 169 (1927); Rioufol, l'Extradition d'apres la Loi du 10 mars 1927, 47 REVUE 
CRITIQUE DE LEGISLATION ET DE JURISPRUDENCE 503 (1927); M. TRAVERS, L'ENTR'AIDE 
REPRESSIVE INT'L ET LA LOI FRANCAISE DU 10 MARS 1927 (1928); Aupecle, supra note 9. 
66. Law ufMar. 10, 1927, supra note 62, art.!. Author's translation. See MERLE & VITU,supra 
note 4, at 322. 
67. Note 62, supra. See Annexe to the prods-verbal de la Seance du 4 mars 1926, JOURNAL OFFICIEL, 
May 1926, at 159; [1927) SIREY, RECUEILGENERAL910 n.l bis. The history of the 1927 extradi-
tion law's nascency is a protracted one. It started in 1878, when an extradition law presented by 
M. Defaure was approved by the Sinat but not by the Chambre. After that, there were several other 
abortive attempts to promulgate an extradition law. In 1900, another version was presented, but 
never discussed. In 1923, another new proposition was presented by M. Renoult. It reproduced, 
with a few modifications, the essential provisions of the 1900 project. The Sinat submitted it to the 
Society of Legislative Studies, which studied and generally approved it. Finally, its propositions 
1981) HISTORY OF EXTRADITION 55 
the absence of an extradition treaty. Therefore, this law is designed principally 
to play the dual role of droit commun (basic law) for extradition in the absence of 
a treaty and droit supplitif where lacunae are found in existing extradition 
treaties. The law does not abrogate any treaties of extradition, but applies 
when a default of a treaty occurs, or where no treaty exists at all, or where 
there is a gap in a particular extradition treaty. 68 The law also functions as a 
guide for negotiations of new extradition treaties. 
B. Extradition Not Required in the Absence oj a Treaty Obligation - United States69 
There was a grand debate in the United States between 1794 and 1840, over 
the issue of whether or not there was a duty to extradite fugitives in the 
absence of a treaty obligation. The first judicial decision to consider the issue 
was United States v. Robins. 70 The Robins decision did not settle the debate, 
however, and divergence of opinion among judges and commentators reigned 
until 1840, when the United States Supreme Court held that no obligation to 
extradite existed apart from that imposed by treaty. 71 The Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its holding in the famous case of United States v. Rauscher,72 in which 
the Court adopted the positivist school's view that extradition had not existed 
until "modern times." Moreover, explained the Court, extradition did not 
come into existence until the "nations of the earth ... imposed upon 
themselves the obligation of delivering up these fugitives from justice to the 
States where their crimes were committed .... "73 
Where extradition did occur, it was generally done pursuant to a treaty be-
tween two sovereign powers. The Court explained that prior to and apart 
from treaties there exists no duty to extradite. If extradition were to occur 
and amendments were approved by the Sinat under the report ofM. Vallier, and by the Clw.mbre, 
under the report of M. Ranaldy. On March 10, 1927, the law was officially promulgated. See 
Donnedieu de Vabres, DE L'EXTRADITION 20 BULLETIN DE LA SOCIETE D'lhuDE LEGISLATIVE 330 
(1924); Donnedieu de Vabres, Rapport Ii La Sociite d' Etudes Ligislatives, 21 BULLETIN DE LA SOCIETE 
D'ETUDES LEGISLATlVES99 (1925); DONNEDIEU DEVABRES, supra note 36, at 976-77. 
68. BOUZAT & PINATEL, supra note 36, at 1658-59. French extradition treaties are self-
executing; if they are duly approved by the legislature and promulgated, they operate without 
further legislative implementation. See MERLE & VITU, supra note 4, at 322; Harvard Research (Ex-
tradition), 29 AM.J. INT'LL. SUPP. 380 (1935); SHEARER,supra note 9, at 11. The Treaties must be 
approved and promulgated by the legislature because they are of the type that modify legislative 
dispositions. CONSTITUTION (Oct. 4, 1958), arts. 52, 53. MERLE & VITU, supra note 4, at 322. 
Once ratification has been obtained, a decree ordains the publication of the treaty in the JOUR. 
NAL OFFICIEL and the treaty is, henceforth, in full force and effect. E.g., id. 
69. Extradition in the United States is a federal, as opposed to a state, power. U.S. CONST. 
art. I, S 10; United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 412-14 (1886). 
70. 27 F. Cas. 825 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175). 
71. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840). 
72. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886). 
73. /d. at 411-12. 
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without the authority of a treaty, it was not based upon a legal obligation, but 
as a matter of comity within the discretion of the government which took the 
action. H The Court was adamant that such an obligation had never been 
recognized as deriving from principles of international law. 75 
The Court inferred from the doctrine writers that because an obl~t:ation to ex-
tradite could not exist until a state assumed that obligation by treaty or one of 
its analogues, it could not have existed except in modern times. 
The perception that extradition required a treaty for its authority influences 
the historical view taken, as well as the practice, of extradition. In Factor v. 
Laubenheimer,76 the Supreme Court reiterated its view that the right, and the 
related obligation, to extradite could only exist pursuant to a treaty: 
rTlhe principles of international law recognize no right to extradi-
tion apart from treaty. While a government may, if agreeable to its 
own constitution and laws, voluntarily exercise the power to sur-
render a fugitive from justice to the country from which he has 
fled, and it has been said that it is under a moral duty to do so ... 
the legal right to demand his extradition and the correlative duty to 
surrender him to the demanding country exists only when created 
by treaty. 77 
Finally, in 1936 the Supreme Court of the United States took the logical 
next step by holding that not only is there no duty to extradite apart from that 
created by a treaty, there is no authority in United States law to do so without 
an express legislative or treaty stipulation. 78 The Court declared: 
Applying, as we must, our law in determining the authority of the 
President, we are constrained to hold that this power, in the 
absence of statute conferring an independent power, must be 
found in the terms of the treaty and that, as the treaty with France 
fails to grant the necessary authority, the President is without 
power to surrender the respondent. 79 
74. ld. 
75. [d. 
76. 290 U. S. 276 (1933). 
77. /d. at 287. 
78. Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5 (1936). 
79. /d., at 18. The opiniOllcontinues with an explanation: 
It cannot be doubted that the power to provide for extradition is a national power; it 
pertains to the national government and not to the states .... But, albeit a national 
power, it is not confined to the executive in the absence of treaty or legislative provision. 
At the very beginning Mr. Jefferson, as Secretary of State, advised the President: "The 
laws of the United States, like those of England, receive every fugitive, and no authority 
has been given to their Executive to deliver them up." As stated byJohn Bassett Moore 
in his treatise on extradition - summarizing the precedents - "the general opinion 
has been, and practice has been in accordance with it that in the absence of a conven-
tional or legislative provision, there is no authority vested in any department of the 
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An extradition treaty, of course, is the law of the land80 and, being generally 
self-executing, does not require implementing legislation. 81 Nevertheless, 
statutes relating to extradition have been enacted by Congress. These statutes, 
unlike those in France, do not authorize extradition in the absence of a treaty. 
In fact, their operation and the authority they confer are expressly made 
dependent on the existence of an appropriate extradition convention. 82 
The first United States legislation concerning extradition· was enacted in 
1848. 83 The Act of 1848 required that any act of extradition be under the 
authority of a treaty and that it be subject to judicial proceedings in federal 
district court. The extradition statute currently in force reads as follows: "The 
provisions of this chapter relating to the surrender of persons who have com-
mitted crimes in foreign countries shall continue in force only during the ex-
istence of any treaty of extradition with such government. "84 
The United States Government has consistently articulated this require-
ment to foreign governments: 
Under the laws of the United States, the Government of the 
United States may extradite an individual from this country to a 
foreign country only in accordance with an extradition agreement. 
It may not extradite an individual to a foreign country in the 
absence of such an agreement or in a case not coming within the 
terms of such agreement. 8; 
In 1947, for example, the United States Government denied a request by the 
government to seize a fugitive criminal and surrender him to a foreign government, 
unless that discretion is granted by law." It necessarily follows that as the legal authori-
ty does not exist save as it is given by act of Congress or by the terms of a treaty, it is not 
enough that a statute does not deny the power to surrender. It must be found that the 
statute or treaty confers the power. 
!d., at 8-9. United States practice has not always been consistent with this view. See, e.,/t., re 
Joseph Fisher, 1 Stuart 245 (1827) (Lower Canada), 6 BRIT. DIG. OF INT'L L. 455 (extradition was 
granted by the United States to Canada in the absence of an applicable treaty provision). Such 
extraditions have occurred during the period of debate over the issue and it appears that extradi-
tion has been granted on the basis of a moral, rather than a legal duty. See SHEARER, supra note 9, 
at 25. International law authorizes, but does not require, extradition. International law is the law 
of the land and regulating the relations between sovereign states does provide for significant ex-
ecutive prerogative. Congress could conceivably authorize extradition in the absence of a treaty, 
but it has never done so. See Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258, 259 (6th Cir. 1957). 
80. U.S. CONST. art. VI, S 2; Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884); Chew Heong v. 
United States, 112 U.S. 536, 540, 556 (1884). 
81. WHITEMAN. supra note 2, at 734. 
82. [d. 
83. Act of Aug. 12, 1848, ch. 167,9 Stat. 302. The current U.S. law is found in 18 U.S.C. § 
3181 (1976). 
84. 18 U.S.C. S 3181 (1976). 
85. Note to Ambassador of the Turkish Republic (Urgiiplu), from Secretary of State Herter, 
May 1, 1959, MS. Dept. of State file 211.8215, Yeneriz, Muhip/3-3059, reprinted in WHITEMAN. 
supra note 2, at 734-35. 
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Soviet Embassy at Washington, to extradite a Soviet national accused of 
embezzlement, explaining: "[I]t is a well-established principle of international 
law that no right to extradition exists apart from treaty. "86 The result is the 
same when the terms of an existing treaty do not cover the circumstances of 
the particular case before the court. Christian Herter, as Acting Secretary of 
State in 1958, suggested this in a letter to an individual who had asked for in-
formation on the subject: 
[I]t may be said that if the offense for which an individual's return 
is desired is not one of those enumerated in the treaty between the 
two countries concerned, the requested country would be under no 
obligation to surrender in extradition an individual charged with 
that offense and the requesting country would be unable to invoke 
the provisions of the treaty to obtain his surrender. 87 
The fountainhead for United States judicial refusal to grant extradition, 
unless there is treaty authority for it, is the 
fundamental consideration that the Constitution creates no ex-
ecutive prerogative to dispose of the liberty of the individual. Pro-
ceedings against him must be authorized by law. There is no ex-
ecutive discretion to surrender him to a foreign government, 
unless that discretion is granted by law ... legal authority does 
not exist, save as it is given by act of Congress or by the terms of a 
treaty .... 88 
The language used by the United States Supreme Court in Valentine leaves no 
doubt that the United States Government will not extradite a fugitive unless 
the circumstances are covered by the terms of a treaty. 89 
Although the executive has no direct power to extradite without prior 
legislative (i. e.) statutory or treaty) authorization, the Executive Branch has a 
powerful influence on judicial interpretation with respect to the existence, ap-
propriateness and applicability of treaty provisions. The judiciary relies on ex-
86. Communication handed by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs 
(Thompson) to the Counselor of the Soviet Embassy at Washington (Tarassenko), Jan. 20, 1947, 
reported in 16 DEP'T STATE BULL 212 (Feb. 2, 1947). See WHITEMAN. supra note 2, at 733. 
87. Letter from Acting Secretary of State Herter to A.I. Mendelsohn, Dec. 29, 1958, MS. 
Dept. of State, file 266.1115/12-1158, reprinted in WHITEMAN. supra note 2, at 733. 
88. Valentine v. United States 299 U.S. 5, 9 (1936). In this case, the United States Supreme 
Court refus(:d to extradite an American national to France, even though the general policy of the 
United States' Government was to eliminate the nationality exemption from extradition. It held 
that the "nationals exemption clause" in the treaty absolutely precluded the right of the ex-
ecutive to extradite one of its nationals. Of course, the holding applies to United States nationals 
only. However, the rationale of the holding is not that nationals will not be extradited unless 
there is reciprocity, but that no extradition can take place unless there is a specific treaty provi-
sion covering it. 
89. Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5 (1936). 
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ecutive expertise in the field of foreign affairs; a Department of State deter-
mination that a treaty exists or that its provisions apply to the facts will be 
upheld in most cases. The executive power to make treaties with the advice 
and consent of the Senate90 and its power to conduct foreign a[fairs91 provide 
the rationale for this reliance. 
Although American jurisprudence will not allow the United States Govern-
ment to extradite a fugitive except under the terms of a valid treaty, the 
United States Government does not hesitate to seek extradition from states 
with which there exists no extradition treaty or when the pertinent treaty fails 
to cover the facts of the specific case. 92 The Department of State is always 
careful to draft such an exradition request so as to indicate clearly to the re-
quested state that there can be no hope for reciprocity under United States 
law. 93 Positive responses by foreign governments to extradition requests made 
in this manner are not uncommon as a matter of comity or on the basis of that 
country's municipal extradition law. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The law of extradition evolved from the need or the desire to obtain custody 
over individuals deemed dangerous to the social cell. This could follow from 
the perception that an affront to the gods or to the leader's authority had to be 
avenged. Such a perception arose when the leader was challenged in his 
authority, as in a directly "political" offense, or when the leader's authority 
was undermined because of some' 'wrong" committed within the scope of his 
"sovereignty." Thus, the distinction between rendition for "common," 
rather than "political," offenses was not appreciated in ancient times. Each 
type of offen'se endangered the sovereignty of the leader of the social cell. In 
many cases, banishment was the appropriate penalty, so the issue of extradi-
90. See, e.g., Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 818 
(1954); set also Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913). 
91. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Missouri v. Holland, 252 
U.S. 416 (1920); L. HENKIN. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972); Henkin, The 
Treaty Makers and Ihe Law Makers: The Law of Ihe Land and Foreign Relations, 197 U. PA. L. REV. 903 
(1959)." 
92. E.g., MOORE. supra note 9, at 33-35; WHITEMAN. supra note 2, at 732-37; SHEARER. supra 
note 9, at 27. Cj I. STAN BROOK & C. STANBRooK. THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF EXTRADITION 
xxvii (1980) (the United Kingdom only grants extradition where reciprocal arrangements have 
been made). 
During the author's stay with the Legal Adviser's Office of the Department of State, which in-
cluded two years of working on extradition matters, there were many such requests. They are 
most common in cases of narcotics violations, which are not included as extraditable offenses in 
most of the older extradition treaties. There is obviously a valid interest in making these requests 
and most of the time a valid interest on the part of the requested country to approve the request. 
Apparently, British practice is similar to that of the United States in this regard. See, id. 
93. See note 92 irifra. 
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tion was moot. However, when either type of offense had to be avenged, ren-
dition was sought. Accordingly, "extradition" and treaties of extradition have 
ancient precedents. 94 
When the "nation-state" evolved, the sovereign continued to desire the 
rendition of criminals and, frequently, "political" offenders. As modern 
theories of criminal science evolved, so did theories of extradition. 95 The no-
tion that the relative power of the sovereigns required the extradition of 
fugitives,96 gave way to the view that natural right and justice required ex-
tradition. 97 Later, positivism served to promote the concept that the 
"legality" of extradition is derived from an extradition treaty, local legislation 
or case law. 98 While the reigning legal philosophy has changed, this brief 
historical sketch indicates that extradition has existed from antiquity and that 
the role of extradition in society has remained relatively CO]1~t:mt. 
The modern French and American legal cultures present contrasting ver-
sions of the law of extradition as it has presently evolved. These versions were 
significantly influenced by legal notions developed in diplomatic practice both 
in antiquity and the Middle Ages. The modern French and American views, 
in turn, have impacted the general law of extradition in modern times. 99 This 
is particularly true with respect to the French influence. The modern extradi-
tion treaty is greatly influenced in its language, scope and structure, by the 
French approach to this ancient problem. loo 
The debate in France in the last century, 101 over the existence of extradition 
in antiquity, as well as the controversy between the "natural law" and 
"positivist" schools with respect to the basis for an obligation to extradite, has 
framed the basic issue of contempory extradition law. However, whether ex-
tradition is derived from the nature of man or from the nature of the modern 
world, the practice of extradition is a fundamental and historically justified 
part of the law of nations. * 
94. See, e.g., Langdon & Gardiner, supra note 9. 
95. See note 44 and accompanying text, supra. 
96. See, e.g., notes 42-43 and accompanying text, supra. 
97. See notes 59-60 and accompanying text, supra. 
98. See, e.g., note 61 and accompanying text, supra. 
99. See, e.g., note 54 and accompanying text, supra. 
100. See, e.g., notes 6-8 and accompanying text, supra. 
101. See, e.g., notes 16-20 and accompanying text, supra . 
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